
Any non-teleological account of the history of thought must, by definition, demonstrate the contingent nature of all thought (i.e. all thought could have been something other than it was - and different from what it currently is). As soon as we realise this, what grounds do we have for expecting anything we say to be taken seriously?
Hold on a moment. The above conclusion must surely be the result of faulty reasoning. Doesn’t the argument embody a form of the genetic fallacy? The contingent origin of our ideas is logically independent from their worth. Ideas should be judged by different criteria, for example internal consistency, applicability to real life and ability to solve problems. When evaluated according to these criteria, the origin of an idea is utterly irrelevant.
There’s only one problem with this - aren’t these criteria also only contingently present?
Hold on a moment. The above conclusion must surely be the result of faulty reasoning. Doesn’t the argument embody a form of the genetic fallacy? The contingent origin of our ideas is logically independent from their worth. Ideas should be judged by different criteria, for example internal consistency, applicability to real life and ability to solve problems. When evaluated according to these criteria, the origin of an idea is utterly irrelevant.
There’s only one problem with this - aren’t these criteria also only contingently present?